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Abstract
Recent theoretical work suggests that the presence of foreign direct investment
(FDI) lowers a country’s noncooperative Nash tariﬀ. To test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst
adapt the theoretical model formulated by Blanchard (2010) to derive an intuitive, em-
pirically testable equation. This equation is an augmentation of the standard formula
equal to the inverse of export supply elasticity. Using constructed estimates of export
supply elasticities and measures of FDI, we test this hypothesis with respect to tariﬀs
set by China prior to 2001. We focus on China before its accession into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) for two primary reasons: ﬁrst, China is a recipient of FDI
during this time; and second, prior to becoming a WTO member China can be seen as
a player in a noncooperative game. We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that before entering
the WTO, China chooses lower tariﬀs, ceteris paribus, for industries that receive more
FDI. This is an important result since having a better understanding of how countries
act unilaterally will provide insight into the multilateral cooperative outcome; that is
trade negotiations.
JEL classiﬁcation: F10; F13; F15
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11 Introduction
The fact that a country can improve its domestic welfare by imposing a trade restrictions
on incoming foreign goods is not new and has been the topic of discussion for centuries.1
Indeed, over one hundred years ago Bickerdike (1906) linked a country’s “optimal” tariﬀ to
the elasticity of home’s import demand, which was later formalized by Johnson (1950-51)
to be equal to the inverse of the elasticity of foreign export supply.2 This has come to be
known as how well a country can aﬀect it’s terms of trade or the “terms-of-trade eﬀect”.
Despite the generality of Johnson’s result, researchers sixty years later are still “ﬁne-tuning”
the classic formula.3 However, with the exception of a few, the majority of these models
maintain that all domestic (foreign) production is owned by domestic (foreign) agents and
all consumption takes place within respective borders.4 We relax the ﬁrst assumption by
allowing for foreign direct investment (FDI) and empirically test the aﬀect this has on a
country’s noncooperative tariﬀ setting.5 This is an important assumption to relax given
the large stock (and ﬂow) of FDI occurring in the world. As a preview, we ﬁnd evidence
that suggest, absent negotiation, countries tend to set lower tariﬀs on industries that receive
more FDI. This is line with theoretical predictions that will be discussed below and formally
introduced in Section 2.
There are two main channels in which the presence (or threat) of FDI can lower the
beneﬁts of a tariﬀ on imports in the standard apolitical setting. One channel is through
1See Irwin (1996) for a fantastic historic account of the debate on the merits of free trade.
2Throughout this paper, we use “optimal tariﬀ” interchangeably with the country’s “non-cooperative
endogenous tariﬀ”.
3Most recently Felbermayr, Jung, and Larch (2011) characterize a country’s unilateral optimal tariﬀ in
a monopolistic setting with ﬁrm heterogeneity ` a la Melitz (2003). See also Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare
(2009) which investigates various domestic trade policies in a small-economy version of the Melitz model
and Cole and Davies (2011) which imposes ﬁxed cost heterogeneity and the possibility of foreign direct
investment.
4A notable exception is Bhagwati and Brecher (1980) which allows for foreign-owned factors of production
and ﬁnds that trade liberalization may actually worsen national welfare. However, the authors do not allow
for tariﬀ revenue as they only look at two scenarios: (1) exogenous shifts in the terms of trade and (2) a
comparison between free trade and autarky.
5The second assumption is relaxed in Cole and Davies (2010) which allows for domestic agents to consume
abroad through tourism and value diﬀerently varieties that are only available in the foreign country.
2so-called “tariﬀ-jumping” – where a foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to open a subsidiary
within domestic boarders to escape paying a tariﬀ. Of course, a tariﬀ is not the only reason
a foreign ﬁrm would choose to engage in FDI.6 Thus, the second channel comes from the fact
that, given FDI is already present within a country, the domestic government cannot protect
the domestic industry solely through a tariﬀ on imports without also protecting the foreign
owned aﬃliates. With regard to tariﬀ-jumping, Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1999) deﬁne the
optimal tariﬀ as one that maximizes domestic ﬁrm proﬁts and shows that in the presence
of tariﬀ-jumping, the preferred tariﬀ is one just low enough to prevent FDI. Thus, in this
setting, ﬁrms do not want full protection, but something less. A drawback from this analysis,
which follows from assuming ﬁrm homogeneity, is that there is no FDI in equilibrium. Cole
and Davies (2011) further explores the eﬀect of tariﬀ-jumping on noncooperative tariﬀs in
the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Here, the optimal tariﬀ maximizes the welfare of a
representative agent and the presence of FDI, again, lowers the noncooperative Nash tariﬀ.
The primary diﬀerence between this analysis and Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1999) is that
both multinationals and exporters are present in equilibrium in Cole and Davies (2011); a
result more prevalent in the real world. Since both multinationals and exporters are present,
the analysis by Cole and Davies (2011) also includes the second channel mentioned.7
In a diﬀerent approach from Cole and Davies (2011) and Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1999),
Blanchard (2010) uses exogenous foreign equity holdings in both the export and import
sector to illustrate how foreign investment can lower a country’s optimal tariﬀ. When ﬁrms
in both countries are owned by agents in both countries, a unilateral tariﬀ in the domestic
country provides gains to foreign owners of domestic ﬁrms (the non-discriminatory protection
channel) and losses to domestic owners of foreign ﬁrms. Additionally, Blanchard (2007) ﬁnds
that vertical FDI also lowers a country’s optimal tariﬀ. In this model domestic ﬁrms invest
6See, for example, Horstmann, and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1997) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004) for horizontal motives and Markusen (2002, Ch.9) for vertical motives to name a few.
7An intuitive example would be the following: If the United States imposed a tariﬀ on Japanese auto-
mobiles, then ﬁrms such as Nissan and Toyota would increase production by plants already within the U.S.
borders (the tariﬀ-jumping channel). Moreover, BMW, which has a plant in South Carolina, would also
beneﬁt from the tariﬀ (the non-discriminatory protection channel) as their cars become relatively cheaper.
3in the host country for purposes of exporting back to the home country, thus extracting rent
from the foreign ﬁrm by a government is indirectly extracting rent from domestic ﬁrms as
well. Blanchard and Matschke (2010) empirically test this claim using U.S. multinationals
and rates of U.S. preferential market access and ﬁnd support.
Empirical work investigating noncooperative tariﬀ setting is diﬃcult and consequently
sparse. Bagwell and Staiger (2011) ﬁnd broad support for the terms-of-trade hypothesis
by looking at tariﬀ setting by WTO members. Additionally, Broda, Lim˜ ao, and Weinstein
(2008) (BLW) investigate non-WTO members to truly isolate noncooperative behavior and
ﬁnd that market power matters in tariﬀ setting. BLW develop methods to estimate export
supply elasticities following Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2008); they ﬁnd that
non-WTO members set higher tariﬀs on goods that are inelastically supplied by foreign
countries.8 These models assume that all of domestic production is owned by domestic
ﬁrms and consequently all of the increased producer surplus as a result of protection is kept
completely within the domestic borders. In other words, they ignore the eﬀect of foreign
investment on optimal tariﬀs.
Though, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to empirically test the theoretical predictions
of the eﬀect horizontal FDI has on noncooperative tariﬀs, we are not the ﬁrst to link FDI
with trade policy. In what Bhagwati et al. (1987) coined quid pro quo FDI, there has been
mixed empirical evidence.9 Blonigen and Feenstra (1997) ﬁnd that the threat of protection
had a substantial, positive eﬀect on greenﬁeld FDI in the United States in the 1980s, but the
protection variable used is a dummy variable taking on only values of zero and one. Since
legislators are not oﬀered a menu of protectionist policies, it is impossible to gauge the level
8Furthermore, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) empirically test the hypothesis of Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and ﬁnd modest support for protection being “sold”. The authors use nontariﬀ barriers instead
of actual tariﬀ rates and also do not speciﬁcally include FDI in their speciﬁcations. McCalman (2004)
implements the speciﬁcation in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) to analyze the process of trade liberalization
in Australia and suggests that “the process of trade liberalization has been driven by increases in both the
fraction of the voting population represented by a lobby, and the government’s relative valuation of welfare”
(pg 91).
9The term quid pro quo FDI refers to when a ﬁrm invests in a foreign country to reduce the “threat” of
protection in the future.
4of protection which presumed social welfare maximizers would prefer. Similarly, Blonigen
and Figlio (1998) investigate the eﬀect of FDI on U.S. legislators’ votes on protectionist
policies between 1985 and 1994 and ﬁnds that quid pro quo FDI has an eﬀect, but not in
a systematic way. For instance, legislators who were initially more protectionist in nature
tended to increase their support for trade restrictions, whereas legislators who took more of
free trade stance were inclined to support lower trade restrictions.
It is quite diﬃcult to empirically test a theoretical hypothesis dealing with non-cooperative
tariﬀ setting in general and particularly so if one wants to include eﬀects of FDI. The reason,
as typical, is data limitations. In order to test whether the presence of FDI has an eﬀect
on a country’s non-cooperative tariﬀ requires a country to be: (1) acting non-cooperatively;
and (2) receiving FDI. China is a logical choice because prior to 2001, it was not a member
of the WTO and was both receiving and reporting foreign investment at the 2-digit SIC
level. It is important to investigate a non-WTO member because tariﬀs set between WTO
countries are cooperative in nature and we are testing the eﬀects of foreign investment on the
non-cooperative optimal tariﬀ. Utilizing this data, we ﬁnd empirical evidence that suggests
greater foreign investment leads to lower tariﬀs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical motivation. In
section 3, we present our empirical results and section 4 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Model
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two main channels in which FDI can aﬀect a
country’s optimal tariﬀ. The ﬁrst is through tariﬀ-jumping and has been illustrated by Cole
and Davies (2011). When ﬁrms choose to create a foreign subsidiary in order to avoid paying
the tariﬀ, the eﬀect is essentially to make the foreign export supply more elastic (“exports”
in the sense of a good not variety - i.e. the supply of Japanese cars not Toyota Camrys).
However, this does not map easily into an empirical speciﬁcation because an industry could
5have very little FDI for many reasons; one being a low tariﬀ. Thus, one would need to
devise an index to represent the “threat” of tariﬀ-jumping. Moreover, as Blonigen (2002)
points out for the U.S., Japanese ﬁrms are the only primary examples of tariﬀ jumping, yet
there are many examples of multinationals from other countries. The second channel and
the one implemented here is described by Blanchard (2010) as the internal eﬀect of foreign
ownership. The intuition here is that a country has less incentive to protect the import
industry if the industry is, at least partially, owned by foreigners. We present a theoretical
model that closely follows Blanchard (2010).
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, and two goods, x and y, where variables
denoted with a superscript asterisk () represents Foreign. Goods markets are perfectly
competitive. We assume that Home has a comparative advantage in good y and thus its
natural import is good x. We restrict to the case where only Foreign can participate in FDI
and can do so only in the Home’s import sector. Relaxing these restrictions will not aﬀect
the results. We denote the percentage of Home production of good x operated by a foreign
subsidiary by ϕ (thus domestically owned home production is equal to (1   ϕ)).












Thus, the world price ratio is pw, and the Home terms-of-trade is 1
pw. We assume the Home
government maximizes the utility of a representative agent with Gorman form preferences.10
We restrict its only policy tool to an ad valorem tariﬀ on imports, which we denote by t where
τ = (1 + t).11 Therefore, the relative local prices can be written as a function of the tariﬀ
and the world price, p = τpw  p(τ,pw) and p = pw. Aggregate Home (Foreign) demand
for each good depends on only local prices and national income, I(I), so that di  di(p,I)
10We further make the common assumption that preferences are identical across countries.
11We are intentionally ignoring the tariﬀ policy of the Foreign country, in order to minimize notation.
Implicitly any eﬀect Foreign’s tariﬀ policy has on the world price will be embedded in the Foreign export
supply elasticity.
6and d
i(p,I) for i 2 fx,yg where
I = (1   ϕ)pqx(p) + qy(p) + (p   p










) + ϕτqx(p). (2)
Home’s income can be interpreted as the share of domestically owned local GDP plus tar-
iﬀ revenue. Similarly, Foreign’s income is their domestic GDP plus the real returns from
ownership abroad.
The balanced budget conditions for both countries are
p






x + ϕpqx (4)
where Mx(p,I)  dx(p,I)   qx(p) denotes Home’s imports of good x and Ey(p,I)  qy(p)  
dy(p,I) is Home’s exports of y (similarly for Foreign as well). Finally, the equilibrium world





w) = Mx(p(τ, ˜ p
w), ˜ p
w). (5)
The optimal tariﬀ for Home is one that maximizes the indirect utility of the representative












































7export supply elasticity.12 It follows that in the absence of FDI, the standard result of to = 1
ϵ
x
remains.13 Therefore, the prediction of this model is that as Foreign export supply becomes
more elastic and/or more FDI is present in an industry, the noncooperative optimal tariﬀ
should be lower.
3 The Empirical Model
3.1 Baseline Model
Equation (7) forms the basis of the model speciﬁcation. However, some adjustments must












Consequently, we use a measure for the inverse elasticity of foreign export supply, 1
ϵ
x =
Inv Exp Elas. Furthermore, to account for any political inﬂuence of certain industries, we
include industry dummies deﬁned by section according to the Harmonized Standard Tariﬀ
schedule, which we deﬁne as the vector .14 In the theoretical model, the term ϕqx represents
the share of the domestic import sector sales that is foreign owned. We assume that this
share is greater than 10% to ensure this is actually FDI and not simply portfolio holdings. We
adhere to the theoretical prediction in equation (7) and therefore, the general econometric
model we employ can be written as follows




F Sharev  Inv Exp Elasv
Importsv
)
+ v + uv, (8)
where the ad valorem tariﬀ, t, varies by HS 4-digit variety, v. The inverse of foreign export
elasticity, Inv Exp Elas, varies by HS 4-digit variety and the term F Share varies by SIC 2-
digit variety with 1
λ our parameter of interest. F Share represents the share of sales attributed
to foreign investment and will be explained in more detail in the Data section. Finally, the
12The result that λ < 0 is based on assuming away the Metzler and Lerner paradoxes.





14Industry dummies are deﬁned in Table 6 in the Appendix.
8term uv is a well behaved error term.
3.2 Data
Tariﬀ data come from the TRAINS database, which provides data at the 6-digit Harmonized
System (HS) level. We use the weighted average across countries of ad valorem tariﬀs set
by China against the rest of the world. Data on export supply elasticities come from BLW.
The authors follow the methodology of Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006)
to estimate the export supply elasticities at the 4-digit HS level over the period 1994-2003.
Their data consists of 15 countries for which a large fraction of products are not constrained
by WTO membership. A more detailed explanation of the methodology is available in BLW.
Foreign direct investment is taken from the Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade at the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) product level. Data on
total industry value is from the 1993 Chinese Statistical Yearbook. Value of output is
“Gross Output Value of Industry” for industrial enterprises with independent accounting
systems in 1992, reported in million yuan (pp. 374-75) and converted to 1992 U.S. dollars
using exchange rates provided by Federal Reserve Economic Data. Industry headings were
concorded to SIC 2-digit industries by the authors in the manner illustrated in Table 7 in the
Appendix. Values for total imports are taken from the TRAINS database, they represent
total imports from the countries in the sample, and are at the 4-digit HS level. All variables
have been merged using the concordances provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) to match the 4-digit HS classiﬁcation. Thus, data at the 4-digit level are simple
averaged and data at the 2-digit level are repeated.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest. The variable t1993
v
is the ad valorem tariﬀ in 1993, and Imports is the total import value in each 4-digit HS
sector in 1992. FDI is the stock of foreign investment, Dom Invest is domestic investment,
and Value is the value of sales; all of which are in 1992 and denominated in 1 million U.S.
9dollars.15 The variables from 1994 are lagged one year to account for possible endogeneity





FDI + Dom Invest
)
 Value.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
t1993
v 37.79 25.96 0 182.2 1122
Inverse Export Elasticity 91.8 266.9 0.002 1,254.5 1,122
Import 69.9 182.6 0 1,724.3 1,121
F Share 0.17 0.14 0 0.5 1,160
Value 28,985 16,548 1,867 51,312 1,041
As mentioned in the introduction, we use Chinese data for two very speciﬁc reasons. The
ﬁrst is that we need a country that is receiving FDI and China meets this criterion. Figure
1 shows investment ﬂows from 1985 to 1996. As can be seen, there is very little FDI (and
total investment for that matter) before 1990. Though FDI begins to increase after 1990,
it does not really start to gain momentum until after 1992. By observing this graph, it
would seem reasonable to focus on later years like 1996 to capture more foreign investment.
However, our theoretical model is for countries that are acting noncooperative and we need
to be aware of possible trade negotiations aﬀecting how China sets its tariﬀ, which brings us
to our second reason for choosing China as our country of interest.
The second reason China is a good match is we need a country that is, as closely as
possible, acting in noncooperative way; i.e. the country cannot be a member of the WTO.
Though China does not join the WTO until 2001, the process begins much earlier. To
provide some context, observe a report issued by the WTO in February of 2001 that contains
discussion on the process of China’s accession:
15To create the stock variable, we drop observations from Hong Kong and Taiwan and then sum the ﬂow
of aggregate FDI from 1990 to 1992.

























Figure 1: Chinese Investment Flows
“Many questions have been raised as to when China could accede to the WTO and
whether it would accede as a developing or developed country. Such questions on
China’s terms of entry are an inherent part of the negotiation. While accession
processes vary in length and can take several years to complete, much depends on
the readiness of the applicant country to meet not only the rules and obligations
of the WTO’s market economy principles, and its policies of pro-competition and
non-discrimination, but also the market access conditions for goods and services
which the applicant country grants to other WTO Members. Because decisions in
the WTO, including those of the Working Party, are normally based on consensus,
all WTO Members and the country seeking membership must be in agreement
that their individual concerns have been met and that all outstanding issues have
been resolved in the course of the deliberations.” (WTO 2001, p. 2)
There are two important points to note here. The ﬁrst is the question of whether China is
to be considered a developed or developing country. This is important because, as paragraph
2 of Article XI implies, a developing country may be allowed special allowance or a phase
in period to conform to the non-discrimination rule. This is not a binary decision, but
unique to each situation. If China has concerns on making a “smooth transition” and
11minimizing price distortions, the expectation of this decision is important. Second, the
Working Party mentioned is comprised of WTO member governments in order to guide
the accession process. Additionally, a signiﬁcant portion of the accession process involves
bilateral negotiations between China and WTO members. These are done privately and,
given the potential length of these negotiations, it is safe to assume that these began early
as well. Thus, using tariﬀs set in the year 2000 or even in 1996 may not be suﬃciently far
away from 2001 to capture noncooperative behavior.
In order to have a better idea of the appropriate year to focus on, we replicate the results
of Broda et. al (2004) for China. These results are presented in Table 2. If we were to
take the signiﬁcance of the variable Inv Exp Elas as an indication of whether China is acting
noncooperatively, then 1993 (the year used in BLW) would be the most recent year we should
use as the export elasticity becomes insigniﬁcant in 1994 and negative and insigniﬁcant for
the years after.16 For this reason and that previously discussed regarding the amount of
inward FDI, we focus our attention on tariﬀs set in 1993 and FDI in 1992.17







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Inv Exp Elas) 3.59 1.670 -.045 -.551 -1.066 -.203
(1.717) (1.354) (.923) (.668) (.699) (.093)
cons 63.225 63.120 45.051 25.536 26.116 -.388
(3.598) (2.219) (1.040) (.930) (1.306) (.222)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 933 1028 1046 1046 1046 1010
R2 0.304 .325 .381 .331 .294 0.047




16As an interesting check, we quickly investigate the eﬀect the elasticity of export supply on the percentage
change in tariﬀs from 1994 to 2000 and it appears that China is lowering tariﬀs the most on industries that
face a more inelastic export supply. Though this is tangential to our paper, it lends support to the ﬁndings
of Bagwell and Staiger (2011).
17Again, we are lagging values of investment, imports, and value of sales to account for endogeneity.
Though we may be concerned that a one year lag is not suﬃcient, given the results of Brainard (1997) on
the proximity-concentration tradeoﬀ, any eﬀects of enodgeneity would work against our hypothesis. Thus,
ﬁnding a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on our FDI measure would be stronger if we able to completely
account for the endogeneity between FDI and tariﬀs.
123.3 Results
The econometric technique we employ is non-linear least squares and is done primarily for


















which is non-linear in the parameter of interest, λ. However, we ﬁrst investigate the rela-
tionship in levels. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 3 is the structural equation (8) without
accounting for any industry ﬁxed eﬀects and constraining the intercept to be equal to the
inverse elasticity of export supply. Our parameter of interest is negative (the expected sign)
and highly signiﬁcant. Since R-squared values in nonlinear least squared regressions have
little to no interpretation, we report the correlation between the predicted and the actual
tariﬀ value, ρ. Our result is robust to including industry ﬁxed eﬀects as can be seen by spec-
iﬁcation (2). In speciﬁcation (3), we allow a coeﬃcient on Inv Exp Elas (α) and a constant.
Though, α is not signiﬁcant, it is the expected sign and our correlation measure, ρ, is much
higher.
Though our results in levels appear nice, we are concerned with nonspherical errors.
Taking logs of both sides makes our errors more resemble white noise. Therefore, we repeat
our ﬁrst set of regressions in logs and present the results in speciﬁcations (4) - (6) in Table
3. The qualitative results remain the same in all speciﬁcations and we see slight signiﬁcance
for our coeﬃcient on Inv Exp Elas (t-statistic = 1.99). Furthermore, we can see that the
correlation between our predicted tariﬀ and the actual tariﬀ is marginally better in the
structural equation in logs.
13Table 3: Base Estimates of the Eﬀect of FDI Presence on the Optimal Tariﬀ
Levels Logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α 0.002 0.024
(0.003) (0.012)
1/lambda -1.0e-08 -8.5e-09 -4.1e-10 -1.0e-08 -1.0e-08 -5.4e-09
(9.1e-11) (1.1e-09) (1.2e-10) (2.9e-12) (4.8e-11) (1.4e-09)
Industry
ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant No No Yes No No Yes
ρ 0.012 0.051 0.591 0.091 0.158 0.578
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the 2-digit SIC level, and N = 1041.
One may possibly concerned with our measure of export supply elasticity. A common ﬁx
employed in the political economy literature is to bring the export elasticity to the left-hand
side of the equation (see Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and McCalman (2004)). This approach
eliminates both the endogeneity and measurement error issues.18 We present the results
from this robustness check in Table 4. These results are almost identical to the double log
speciﬁcations in Table 3 with a slightly less ρ.
Table 4: Inverse Export Elasticity on LHS
Logs
(1) (2) (3)
1/lambda -8.9e-09 -9.9e-09 -9.9e-09
(2.2e-10) (2.13e-10) (2.1e-10)
Industry
ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Constant No No Yes
ρ 0.051 0.328 0.395
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at
the 2-digit SIC level, and N = 1041.
Another possible concern is that although our model is for horizontal FDI, a large amount
of FDI into China during this period may be vertical FDI. As a robustness check we rerun
18The measurement error is addressed because the noise associated with estimating ϵi is incorporated into
the error of estimated equation; see Greene (1990).
14our speciﬁcations after dropping observations that belong to the SIC industries 22, 23, 35,
and 36, as these are industries typically associated with vertical FDI/export platform. We
present these results in Table 5 and, as can be seen, the qualitative results remain.
Table 5: Estimates of the Eﬀect of Horizontal FDI Presence on the Optimal Tariﬀ
Levels Logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α -1.0e-05 0.021
(0.003) (0.012)
1/lambda -1.0e-08 -9.0e-09 -4.9e-10 -1.0e-08 -1.0e-08 -6.0e-09
(7.5e-11) (1.1e-09) (9.6e-11) (2.9e-12) (2.0e-11) (9.0e-10)
Industry
ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant No No Yes No No Yes
ρ 0.026 0.025 0.537 0.091 0.125 0.533
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the 2-digit SIC level, and N = 771.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate whether the presence of FDI in an industry aﬀects the non-
cooperative optimal tariﬀ for that industry. We provided a theoretical model based oﬀ of
Blanchard (2010) along with theoretical intuition by Cole and Davies (2011) and Ellingsen
and W¨ arneryd (1999) that predicts the optimal tariﬀ is decreasing in the share of foreign
ownership in an industry. We then took this prediction to the data by utilizing Chinese
data prior to their induction into the WTO. We ﬁnd empirical support for our theoretical
prediction. This ﬁnding is important for two main reasons. First, it is imperative to under-
stand noncooperative strategies in order to better understand how to reach Pareto superior
negotiated outcomes. Secondly, it highlights ﬁrm proﬁts are not constrained within country
borders and this aﬀects strategic trade policy.
15APPENDIX
Table 6: U.S. HST Industry Deﬁnitions
Section Deﬁnition
sect1: Live animals; animal products
sect2: Vegetable products
sect3: Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats;
animal or vegetable waxes.
sect4: Prepared foodstuﬀs; beverages, spirits, and vinegar; tobacco and manufactured
tobacco substitutes.
sect5: Mineral products.
sect6: Products of the chemical or allied industries.
sect7: Plastics and articles thereof rubber and articles thereof.
sect8: Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and articles thereof; saddlery and harness;
travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than
silkworm gut).
sect9: Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork; manufacturers
of straw, of esparto or other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork.
sect10: Pulp of wood or of other ﬁbrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or
paperboard; paper and paperboard and articles thereof.
sect11: Textile and textile articles.
sect12: Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seatsticks, whips, riding-
crops and parts thereof; prepared feathers and articles made therewith; artiﬁcial
ﬂowers; articles of human hair.
sect13: Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials; ceramic products;
glass and glassware.
sect14: Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, precious metals, metals
clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin.
sect15: Base metals and articles of base metal.
sect16: Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof; sound
recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers,
and parts and accessories of such articles.
sect17: Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment.
sect18: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or
surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments; parts
and accessories thereof.
sect19: Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof.
sect20: Miscellaneous manufactured articles.
sect21: Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques.
sect22: Special classiﬁcation provisions; temporary legislation; temporary modiﬁcations
proclaimed pursuant to trade agreements legislation; additional import restrictions
proclaimed pursuant to section 22 of the agricultural adjustment act, as amended.
16Table 7: SIC Industry Heading(s)
SIC Deﬁnition
8 Logging and transport of timber and bamboo
10 Ferrous metals mining and dressing; Nonferrous metals mining and dressing
12 Coal mining and dressing
13 Petroleum and natural gas extraction
14 Building materials and other non-metal; Salt mining; Other minerals mining
and dressing




24 Timber processing, bamboo, can, palm ﬁber and straw products
25 Furniture manufacturing
26 Paper making and paper products
27 Printing
28 Chemicals and allied products; Medical and pharmaceutical products;
Chemical ﬁbers
29 Petroleum processing; Coking, gas and coal related products
30 Rubber products; plastic products
31 Leather, furs, and related products
32 Building materials and other non-metal
33 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous
34 Metal products
35 Machine building industry
36 Electric equipment and machinery; Electronic and telecommunications equipment
37 Transportation equipment
38 Instruments, meters and other measuring equipment
39 Cultural, educational, and sports articles; Arts and crafts articles
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